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Abstract 
We propose that auction duration and auction 
description are two important auction design 
parameters that could serve as screening mechanisms 
for quality in online auctions. Using data from an online 
labor matching platform that connects buyers with IT 
service vendors, we examine the effects of auction 
duration and auction descriptions on auction outcomes 
(i.e., number of bids, bidder quality, bidding price) and 
project outcomes (i.e., project being contracted and 
being completed). Our empirical analyses show that, in 
buyer-determined reverse auctions of online labor 
matching, auctions with a longer duration and a longer 
description attract more bids, but they also attract more 
low quality bidders with less experience and lower 
completion rate, and hence result in a lower probability 
of successful contracting and completion of software 
service projects. Our research provides empirical 
evidence highlighting the strategic roles of auction 
design parameters like auction duration and 
descriptions as a potential screening mechanism for 
online labor matching platforms. 
  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Advanced information and communications 
technologies have enabled global online labor matching 
that facilitates the pairing of buyers with service 
providers across the globe with low search and 
transaction costs. These markets usually operate in the 
form of reverse auctions, where buyers post “Call for 
Bids” (CFB) and service providers submit bids to 
compete for contracts and offer services. Online labor 
matching platforms have been expanding at an 
astounding pace since its inception. The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics estimates that more than 30 million 
people now work as independent professionals in the US 
alone. Due to their significant impact on economy, 
online labor matching platforms have also drawn much 
attention in the academic literature [1-6]. Most of the 
extant literature focuses on the rules governing the 
selection of winning providers [1, 4, 7]. While the 
selection of winning bid is important, it is only half the 
story, both because how bidders are attracted to the 
auctions (i.e., auction outcome) reveals important 
implications for who the buyers could contract and 
because whether a project is successfully carried out 
(i.e., project outcome) is very important from the 
buyers’ perspective. As noted in the extant literature, 
different auction designs could significantly alter the 
strategic behavior of bidders [3]. Surprisingly, there are 
very few empirical papers that examine the role of 
auction design parameters in affecting auction outcomes 
and project outcomes. This paper seeks to provide a new 
lens of screening to understand the role of two auction 
design factors: auction duration and auction description.  
Among different auction design parameters of online 
labor matching platforms, prior research has squarely 
focused on bid visibility [3]. Similar to other auction 
settings, auctions in online labor matching platforms 
allow buyers to vary multiple design parameters (e.g., 
project category, project budget, auction duration, 
auction description), among which project category is 
exogenous (e.g., software development, web design, 
etc.). Although buyers also set the project budget, it is 
largely determined by the complexity of the project. 
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 Buyers have the most degree of freedom in setting 
auction duration and providing auction descriptions. 
Therefore, auction duration and descriptions are the key 
design parameters when launching an auction by a 
buyer. Intuitively, one would expect longer auctions and 
more detailed auction descriptions to benefit the buyers, 
as they can help attract more bidders and reduce project 
uncertainty for the bidders. Therefore, auctions with 
longer duration and more detailed descriptions are 
presumed to produce better auction outcomes and 
project outcomes1. However, this is yet to be empirically 
corroborated. Especially, the relationship with respect to 
project outcomes has not been studied much but are 
arguably the most important to buyers.    
Therefore, our first research question is: does longer 
auction duration lead to better or worse auction 
outcomes and project outcomes for online labor 
matching platforms?  
 
Auction duration is an essential aspect of online 
auction design. Unlike traditional English auctions held 
in auction houses where bidders gather in a room to bid 
for a product within a few minutes, online auctions 
usually last for days, sometimes even months. Duration 
of the auction is generally a decision of the buyer, and it 
may have a significant impact on the bidders’ decision 
to enter the auction. Haruvy and Leszczyc [8] have 
provided a comprehensive review of the literature that 
looks at auction duration’s impact. In highlighting 
important results related to auction duration from the 
literature, we summarize the key findings in Table 1. As 
can be seen, the context of most of these studies is 
ordinary forward auction, in which price is the outcome 
variable and tends to go up as the auction continues. Our 
research, instead, focuses on reverse auction in the 
context of online labor matching market where price 
tends to go down when bidders compete with each other 
in order to win the bid. The conventional view is that 
longer auctions would perform better, as they attract 
more bidders and bids, which in turn would result in 
better outcomes. On the other hand, an opposing and 
unconventional view is that while longer duration 
attracts more bids, it may drive away impatient bidders 
or bidders who can afford to forego the opportunity by 
taking on other shorter-duration auctions, therefore 
inadvertently resulting in adverse selection and 
negatively impacting project outcomes.  Therefore, 
while seemingly intuitive, the effect of auction duration 
on project outcomes is not as straightforward and clear-
cut as one might think and warrants an in-depth 
empirical investigation. 
                                                
1 Auction outcomes include number of bids attained and overall bidder 
quality in an auction, while project outcomes refer to whether a service 
provider is awarded the contract	 and whether the project is 
 
 
 
Table 1. Related Studies on Auction Duration 
Authors 
(Year) 
Context and 
Method 
Key insights 
Cox [9] Forward auction 
(Observational) 
Longer auctions 
attract more bids. 
Ariely and 
Simonson [10] 
Forward auction 
(Observational) 
Auction duration 
negatively affects 
final price. 
Bapna et al. 
[11] 
eBay, forward 
auctions 
(Observational) 
Longer auction 
negatively affects 
price dynamics. 
Mithas et al. 
[12] 
Reverse auctions 
(Observational) 
Auction duration 
has no effect on 
buyer surplus. 
Haruvy and 
Leszczyc [8] 
eBay and a local 
auction site, 
forward auctions 
(Experiments) 
On eBay, longer 
duration leads to 
more bids and a 
higher price; no 
effect is found at 
the local site. 
Bapna et al. 
[12] 
Overlapping auctions 
(Observational) 
Longer auction 
leads to higher 
bid prices 
 
 
Auction description, on the other hand, has not been 
studied as much. An intuitive view is that detailed 
descriptions reduce bidder uncertainty as longer 
descriptions help bidders better understand project 
requirements, and hence they can help achieve better 
outcomes. This also implies that projects should have 
fairly detailed descriptions. However, anecdotal 
observations suggest that there is huge variation in 
auction descriptions even for the same type of projects 
(e.g., build a website). This variation allows us to study 
and understand the effect of auction descriptions on 
auction outcomes. Our second research question is: does 
longer auction description in an auction lead to better 
or worse auction and project outcomes for online labor 
matching platforms? Given that project contracts and 
the actual details are only provided after a winning 
bidder has been chosen, auction descriptions may not be 
as essential as one assumes in the bidder’s decision to 
submit a bid or the buyer’s selection of the eventual 
service provider. By the same token, capable bidders 
may be less dependent on description details, but novice 
bidders would be more receptive to the requirements of 
projects. If this is indeed the case, then auction 
descriptions may serve (unknowingly) as a screening 
mechanism for bidder quality. In essence, since longer 
auction descriptions provide more details and hence 
successfully completed, conditionally on a service provider being 
selected. 
Page 3412
 reduces bidder’s uncertainty about the project, one 
would presume that longer auction descriptions lead to 
greater performance. However, more experienced and 
capable bidders may be less sensitive to such project 
uncertainty than less experienced and capable bidders, 
so longer auction descriptions may in fact attract a larger 
proportion of low quality bidders, thus hurting 
performance. We are interested in knowing whether 
detailed project information provided early at the 
beginning of the auction helps or hurts auction outcomes 
and project outcomes. 
In summary, we argue that the true effects of auction 
duration and auction description go beyond simply 
attracting more bids, as they can potentially act as 
screening mechanisms for bidder quality that affect the 
composition of bidders attained in an auction and 
consequently the outcomes of the project. This paper 
aims to provide a comprehensive examination linking 
auction design to auction outcomes (i.e., number of bids, 
bidder quality, bidding price) and consequently to 
project outcomes (i.e., project being contracted and 
being completed). 
Based on a unique dataset from an online labor 
matching platform, we empirically examine several 
aspects of bidder entry and auction outcomes to consider 
the following factors: number of bids, bidder quality, 
bidding price, whether a project reaches a contract, and 
project final completion (conditional on contract). Our 
empirical analyses show that, in buyer-determined 
reverse auctions of online labor matching, auctions with 
longer duration and longer description indeed attract 
more bids but they also attract more low quality bidders 
with less experience and lower prior completion rate, 
and in turn lead to a lower probability of successful 
completion of software service projects. Our research 
provides empirical evidence regarding the strategic 
roles of auction duration and auction description as a 
potential screening mechanism for quality on online 
labor matching platforms. Shorter duration and shorter 
description actually help screen out less experienced and 
less capable bidders, and in turn result in higher contract 
probability and completion rate. This finding helps 
explain why many online labor matching platforms have 
now placed a duration limit on their auctions.    
 
2. Study Context 
The context of our study is online labor matching 
platforms. Besides the rich data this context provides us, 
online labor matching platform is economically 
important in its own right. As cited by Hong et al. [3], 
both Elance and Freelancer host millions of registered 
                                                
2 Please note that the marketplace has changed its reputation system 
after our observational period from a 1-10 scale system to a 1-5 scale 
system, in October 2010. 
services providers and have billions of dollars’ worth of 
transactions, boasting a “Freelancer Economy” and 
becoming an exemplar for the emerging gig economy. 
Our empirical data is obtained from the proprietary 
database of a large online labor matching platform, 
which employs the mechanism of buyer-determined 
reverse auction [1, 3, 5, 6, 13]. Buyers initiate “call for 
bids” by posting projects in the marketplace. To post a 
project, a buyer needs to specify auction parameters 
such as auction duration and project-related information 
such as project category, description, and budget.  
 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of One Project on the 
Marketplace2 
 
Figure 1 shows an example of call for bids by a 
project to build a website. There is no fee for posting 
auctions with different auction durations, and the buyer 
could end the auction early at any time (i.e., the buyer 
does not need to wait until the full auction duration 
elapses). After a project is posted to the marketplace 
website, the bidders (i.e., vendors or service providers) 
start bidding on the project. The buyer could close the 
auction with or without selecting a bidder to contract 
with. The auction automatically closes for bidding after 
the auction duration expires (e.g., 7 days). Specifically, 
we are interested in two main parameters: 
Page 3413
 Auction Duration: To post a project, the buyer needs 
to specify the duration of the auction in days, but the 
buyer could terminate the auction anytime during the 
auction duration and award the contract to a particular 
vendor. However, since bidders have no idea whether a 
buyer will end an auction early or not, the preset auction 
duration would influence bidders’ behaviors when they 
submit their bids. 
Auction Description: To post a project, the buyer 
needs to provide a description of the project. The 
description does not need to be a full contract but instead 
is meant to inform potential bidders of the project 
requirements to some extent. The buyer could specify 
contract details of the project after selecting a bidder. 
 
3. Literature Review  
 
3.1. Reverse Auction Design 
Reverse auctions mean those auction processes 
starting with the buyers’ announcement regarding the 
requirement and auction parameters. Then the bidders 
bid for the contract or product [12, 14]. Nowadays, 
reverse auctions are prevalent in online labor markets 
[3], B2B procurements [12], and C2C commerce [15].  
Given the burgeoning use of online reverse auctions 
in various online platforms, very little empirical 
research explores the reverse auction design strategy, 
specifically the auction design regarding information 
revelation and duration. With regard to information 
revelation, Kannan [16] found that whether the 
Complete Information Setting (CIS) leads to a higher 
buyer surplus than Incomplete Information Setting (IIS) 
or not is still an inconclusive question. However, his 
study merely focuses on the competition information 
revelation instead of the task requirement or demand 
information. In terms of auction duration, the results are 
also mixed and inconclusive. Lucking-Reiley [15] 
suggested that longer auction duration might lead to a 
higher transaction price while Miltas and Jones [12] 
found that auction duration doesn’t influence buyer 
surplus. Haruvy and Leszczyc [8], instead, found that 
long auction duration leads to a lower auction price in 
local websites. However, these studies mainly explore 
the auction outcome based on the single-attribute (price) 
and ignore the bidders’ quality and other attributes. 
As Choudhury, Hartzel, and Konsynski [8] pointed out, 
it is quality instead of price that plays the important role 
in choosing providers of Inventory Locator Service 
(ILS) in the aircraft parts industry and hence the quality 
of bidders may be of more interest to buyers. In this 
paper, we focus on investigating how two non-price 
auction design parameters (i.e., auction duration and 
auction description) may influence the auction 
outcomes (e.g., the number of bids, the bidders’ quality, 
etc.) through the varied information amount and waiting 
time. Moreover, instead of examining the auction 
performance in terms of price, we explore how the 
buyers can provide project information and set auction 
duration appropriately to attract more bidders, 
especially high-quality bidders, to improve auction 
outcomes and project outcomes.  
 
 3.2. Information, Duration and Behavior 
Decisions  
Based on the Behavior Decision Making theory [17], 
information representation influences the uncertainty 
assessment process in one or more phases including the 
followings: 1) information acquisition; 2) uncertainty 
evaluation; 3) action and implement choices; and 4) 
learning or feedback. In the context of online labor 
matching, information revelation parameters influence 
bidders’ information advantage and uncertainty 
assessment. Meanwhile, auction duration influences 
bidders’ opportunity cost of bidding actions and 
learning behavior. 
In particular, the information asymmetry between 
bidders and buyers is partially dependent on the task 
description design. According to the auction theory, 
when bidders are faced with the auction decision, they 
need to cope with three types of information, namely, 
private information, public information and uncertainty 
[18], as shown in Table 2. The length or completeness 
of task description increases the public information and 
lowers the uncertainty generally. As such, longer 
description tends to attract more bids. In addition, the 
task description influences the importance of bidder-
specific private information and cost uncertainty, which 
influence the competitive advantage of high-capability 
bidders. 
 
Table 2. Types of Information Cues in Auction 
Decisions 
Subcategory Characteristics Description 
Private 
information 
information known to 
one bidder but not the 
others 
Private 
information 
regarding task 
content and 
difficulties 
Public 
information 
information known to all 
bidders 
Project 
description, 
project budgets, 
and the 
employers’ 
reputation, etc. 
Page 3414
 Project cost 
uncertainty 
Information which is 
common or specific 
across all the bidders but 
known to no bidder 
Uncertainties 
regarding the 
projects’ value to 
the employers, the 
variation of the 
production cost 
(Schwartz and 
Moon 2000), and 
the possibility that 
a catastrophic 
event may occur 
before the project 
is completed.   
 
In addition, auction duration has an impact on not 
only bidders’ opportunity costs related to the bid 
decision but also their learning processes. Even though 
it has been found that auction duration enhances the 
probability of attracting more bidders at different time 
zones [12], it may also increase the waiting time and 
discourage some bidders’ entry decision. Further, the 
longer duration might have different impacts on high-
capability and lower-capability bidders [11].  
 
4. Hypotheses development 
According to the Behavior Decision Making theory, 
auction description may influence a provider’s bid 
decision during the stages of information acquisition 
and uncertainty evaluation, while auction duration may 
be more related to the action and implementation of 
choices as well as the learning and feedback processes. 
Moreover, both auction description and auction duration 
may have a heterogeneous effect on bidders depending 
on their capability and experience. 
 
4.1. Auction Description and Bid Decision 
 
We use the following setup to explicate and explore 
how auction description affects bidder entry and shifts 
bidder quality distribution. The buyer could describe the 
project in more or less detail when the buyer posts an 
auction. Detailed auction description provides more 
public information for all the bidders to help them to 
understand the project requirements and construct their 
expectations about the production difficulties. 
Furthermore, longer auction description indicates that 
the employer has a clearer idea about the project 
requirements and may be able to provide more useful 
and specific instructions about the project 
implementation. The pre-contract auction description 
hence can alleviate bidders’ uncertainty about the 
project’s cost and valuation. Therefore, longer auction 
description lowers the information asymmetry between 
the employer and the bidders regarding the task, 
decreases the general uncertainty, and attracts more 
bidders. 
As an illustration of the potential effects of auction 
descriptions, consider two types of bidders: low quality 
and high quality. Low quality bidders are characterized 
by low project experience and/or low technical 
capability; vice versa for high quality bidders. On the 
other hand, high quality bidders have more private 
information because of their project experience and 
technical capability (e.g., project requirements 
analysis). So they are better at inferring a project’s value 
than less experienced bidders [19]. Since high quality 
bidders are more capable of implementing the project 
and avoiding the risks during the production process, 
they tend to have less  cost uncertainty than low quality 
bidders. Especially when the description is short, high-
capability bidders are more competent to cope with the 
uncertainty and make a better bid decision. Therefore, 
shorter auction description could potentially (either 
intentionally or unintentionally) help screen out less 
experienced and capable bidders.  In other words, 
although longer auction description might lead to more 
bids, it likely ends up attracting more inexperienced 
bidders. Therefore, we propose: 
H1a: Longer auction description leads to more bids 
in total. 
H1b: Longer auction description leads to lower 
average bidder quality (in terms of seller win rate and 
seller success rate). 
 
4.2. Auction Duration and Bid Decision 
 
Apart from auction description, auction duration 
may also have an impact on auction outcomes (i.e., 
number of bids and bidder quality). First, it is intuitive 
to assume that an auction with longer duration should 
result in more bids because longer auction would be 
exposed to more service providers, everything else 
being equal. Longer duration increases the probability 
of the project being discovered and considered when 
vendors browse through the directory of open auctions 
for projects on the website. Further, an interesting 
follow-up question is to explore how auction duration 
affects bidder quality. For one thing, auction duration 
influences bidders' actions or their implementation of 
choices because of the opportunity costs involved in the 
waiting stage. Especially for high-quality bidders, they 
tend to have high reservation wage and high opportunity 
costs, which discourages them from spending too much 
time waiting for the buyers’ pending choices. For 
another thing, high-quality contractors, compared to 
low-quality contractors, tend to have stronger market 
power and be less susceptible to the price dynamics 
through the whole auction duration [11]. Therefore, 
low-quality contractors are more likely to bid for 
auctions with longer duration so that they could have 
enough time to learn from previous bids and to infer the 
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 project value and uncertainty. Additionally, when the 
buyer posts an auction with a longer duration (regardless 
intentionally or unintentionally), bidders may interpret 
this as a signal that the buyer is trying to minimize 
contractor surplus by encouraging the competition 
among contractors. This signal in turn may drive away 
high-quality contractors as they are more likely to find 
another project whose buyer is more munificent and 
discreet and they are more likely to earn a higher 
surplus. Therefore, we propose: 
H2a: Longer auction duration leads to more bids in 
total. 
H2b: Longer auction duration leads to lower 
average bidder quality (in terms of seller win rate and 
seller success rate). 
 
5. Empirical Methodology 
 
5.1. Data 
 
We obtained our data from the proprietary database 
of one large online labor matching platform, which 
connects buyers with IT service providers, from August 
2008 to April 2010. This unique data set allows us to 
observe every aspect of the project, bidders, auction 
outcomes and project outcomes free of error. In our 
observational period, we have a random sample of 
69,323 projects, which attracted 1084,884 bids. Out of 
the 69,323 projects, 41,822 reached a contract.  We 
focus on the most common, free to post open-bid 
projects, which account for more than 80% of all the 
projects. Special projects such as featured projects, trial 
projects and long term projects are not included in this 
data set. Focusing on the most common form of auctions 
allows us to have a better estimate of the effects of 
auction duration and auction description without being 
influenced by other confounding factors. Table 3 
defines our variables and the corresponding measures, 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of key 
variables. 
 
Table 3. Definitions and Measures of 
Key Variables 
Auction Design Variables 
Auction Duration: Number of days the auction is 
active 
Auction Description: Number of words in the auction 
description 
Auction Outcome Variables 
Number of Bids: Total number of bids received by 
the auction 
Average Bidder Win 
Rate: 
Average of a bidder’s auction 
winning rate 
Average Bidder Success 
Rate: 
Average of a bidder’s awarded 
project success rate 
Control Variables 
Project Budget: Buyer-specified project budget 
Time: Year-month dummies 
Project Category: Project category dummies 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Contracted 0.602  0.489  0.000  1.000  
Completed 0.426  0.494  0.000  1.000  
Auction 
Duration 
10.273  15.597  1.000  60.000  
Auction 
description 
101.550  131.378  1.000  7944.000  
Project Budget 339.955  192.058  250.000  750.000  
Number of 
Bids 
13.367  14.670  1.000  89.000  
Average Bid 
Price 
164.310  168.366  29.000  1515.625  
Avg(bidder 
win rate) 
0.076  0.093  0.000  1.000  
Avg(bidder 
success rate) 
0.417 0.290 0.000  1.000  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Distribution of Bids During the 
Auction Duration 
Notes: In the X axis, the bar within the interval between 0 and 1 
means the number of bids submitted at the same day when the project 
was posted. The second bar represents the number of bids submitted 
when the number of bids submitted at the first day after the project 
was posted. The percentage of bids submitted from the project 
submission time to the first day occupies 81.8% of total bids. 
 
5.2. Model-free Evidence 
 
Before we estimate the effects of auction duration 
and auction description on auction outcomes and project 
outcomes using econometric methods, we provide some 
model-free evidence based on visualization of the 
distributions and non-parametric tests. Figure 2 shows 
the distribution of bids during the auction duration. We 
also present the overlaid histograms in Figure 3 to 
exhibit the differences in the distributions of both bidder 
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 ratings and bidder experience with regard to different 
auction durations and different auction descriptions. For 
auction duration, 5 days and 30 days are  shown, and for 
auction descriptions, long description (> average length) 
versus short description (< average length) are shown. 
 
Figure 3. Overlaid Histograms 
We also run non-parametric tests for distributional 
inequality. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
determine whether the two independent samples have 
been drawn from the same populations with the same 
distribution or from populations with different 
distributions. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests shows that the 
bidder experience distributions are significantly 
different for auctions with different auction duration and 
descriptions (p<0.001). 
 
6. Empirical Models 
 
6.1. Project-level Empirical Analysis 
 
We follow extant studies [3] that examined auctions 
in online labor matching markets to set up the empirical 
model. Equation (1) outlines our empirical model for 
estimating the effects of auction format on the number 
of bids received in an auction. This empirical model 
includes the main variables “Auction Duration” and 
“Auction Description”, buyer fixed effects 𝛿", project 
category fixed effects 𝜆$, time fixed effects 𝜓&, as well 
as auction/project-level control variables, such as 
project budge. In Equation (1), parameter i is used to 
index projects, j is used to index project categories, q is 
used to index buyers, and t is used to index time periods 
(year-month pairs). A similar econometric specification 
is used for Equations (2) – (4). We take natural log 
transformation for the following variables: number of 
bids (ln(num_bids)), buyer experience 
(ln(experience+1)) and auction duration (ln(duration)), 
considering that the distributions for these variables are 
skewed. The log-transformation also allows percentage 
interpretations of the model estimates. 𝑩𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒓	𝑬𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒊𝒋𝒒𝒕 = 𝛽5 + 𝛽7×𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛C$"& + 𝛽D×𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛C$"& + 𝛽J 𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠C +	𝛿" + 𝑡& ∗ 𝛼&& + 𝑐$ ∗ 𝛾$$ + 𝜀C$"&	 									(1)													𝑨𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏	𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒋𝒒𝒕 = 𝛽5 + 𝛽7×𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛C$"& + 𝛽D×𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛C$"& + 𝛽J 𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠C +	𝛿" + 𝑡& ∗ 𝛼&& + 𝑐$ ∗ 𝛾$$ + 𝜀C$"&	 								(2)												
                                    
Tables 5 and 6 report the main findings of the effects 
of auction design variables on the number of bids and 
bidder quality, respectively.  
In Table 5, our main dependent variable of interest 
is the number of bids. As Column (1) shows, not 
surprisingly both auction duration and auction 
description have a positive and significant effect on the 
number of bids. Specifically, 10% increase in auction 
duration (on average, 1 day) leads to 2.22% more bids, 
and 10% increase in description length (on average, 10 
words) leads to 3.58% more bids. Therefore, H1a and 
H2a are both supported. 
 
Table 5. Results for Auction Outcomes 
 (1) 
DVs: ln(num_bids) 
ln(duration) 0.222*** 
 (0.008) 
ln(description) 0.358*** 
 (0.008) 
project budget 0.021*** 
 (0.003) 
2.project_category 0.016 
 (0.021) 
3.project_category 0.358*** 
 (0.016) 
4.project_category 0.398*** 
 (0.027) 
Constant 1.011*** 
 (0.059) 
Observations 69,323 
R-squared 0.170 
Number of buyers 19,532 
Buyer FE Yes 
Time Dummies Yes 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
Table 6. Results for Contractor Quality 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES avg(win_rate) avg(success_rate) 
ln(duration) -0.006*** -0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
ln(description) -0.013*** -0.036*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
project budget -0.001*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
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 2.project_category 0.008*** -0.039*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
3.project_category -0.017*** 0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
4.project_category -0.007** -0.098*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Constant 0.127*** 0.516*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) 
Observations 69,323 69,323 
R-squared 0.054 0.091 
Number of buyers 19,532 19,532 
Buyer FE Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
In Table 6, the dependent variables of interest are 
measures of bidder quality, as defined and measured in 
Table 3.  Interestingly, we find consistent effects across 
all measures. The estimations show that auctions with a 
longer duration attract more low quality bidders, and 
auctions with longer descriptions also attract more low 
quality bidders. For example, as Column (1) shows, 
10% increase (1 day) in auction duration reduces 
average win rate by approximately 0.06%3, and 10% 
increase (10 words) in auction description decreases 
average success rate by 0.13%4. Altogether, these 
findings provide empirical support that shorter duration 
and shorter description influence bidder behaviors and 
can help screen out inexperienced and less capable 
bidders.  In essence, H1b and H2b are both supported.  
 
6.2. Bidder-level Empirical Analysis 
 
In order to further explore how auction design 
characteristics influence bidders’ bid choice, we 
construct a list of active bidders and open projects on the 
market for each day during our study period. We define 
active bidders as those who at least bid for one project 
at that day. We recover active bidders’ consideration 
sets by narrowing down to the other projects that are in 
the same category and submitted at a similar time as the 
project(s) they bid. Assuming that bidders are rational 
and make their optimal bid decision by evaluating those 
open projects within their consideration sets based on 
project characteristics, employer characteristics, etc., 
the econometric model at the bidder level is specified 
as:  
 𝐏𝐫	(𝑩𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒊_𝒃𝒊𝒅𝒔_𝒐𝒏_𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒋) = 𝛼 + 𝛽7×𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$ + 𝛽D×𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$ + 𝛽J×𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$×
                                                
3 If we increase project duration by 10%, avg(win_rate) decreases 
0.006*0.1=0.06%. 
	
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦C& + 𝛽e×𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$×𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦C& + 	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠$ + 𝛿& + 𝜀C&              (3) 
 
We limit our sample to bids that are submitted within 
the first day for the following reasons. First, the bids 
within the first day include most bids. There are on 
average around 75% of bids submitted within the first 
day for an open project. Second, since the average 
bidder quality decreases as the auction progresses, our 
estimated results based on the bid choice at the first day 
serve as a conservative estimate. Third, by ruling out 
those bids submitted in the later days, we avoid the 
contamination of those bidders who make the bid 
decision by herding, mimicking or learning from other 
bidders’ bid decisions. Further, to show the robustness 
of our result, we estimate our model with both the 
Conditional Logit Model and Linear Probability Model 
with bidders-day pair level fixed effects5 (Table 7).  
Moreover, the result is consistent when we rerun the 
analysis by including all the submitted bids into our 
sample. 
As Table 7 shows, the main effect of project 
description and auction duration are significantly 
positive. In other words, the longer project description 
or the longer auction duration, the higher number of bids 
the project will attract, which lends to support H1a and 
H2a. 
However, the interaction between project 
description and the bidder’s win rate is significantly 
negative. Moreover, the interaction between project 
duration and the bidder’s success rate is also 
significantly negative. As such, if bidders are of high-
quality, such as those who tend to have a high 
probability to win the auction or those who usually 
actually complete projects in time, they are less likely to 
bid for projects with the longer description or longer 
auction duration. In other words, bidders with a higher 
win rate or success rate are less likely to bid for a project 
with long auction description or auction duration. As 
such, projects with long description or auction duration 
tend to disproportionately attract low-quality bidders. 
Therefore, both H1b and H2b are supported. 
 
Table 7. Results for Bidders’ Auction Choices 
 (1) (2) (3) 
4 If we increase project description by 10%, avg(success_rate)  
decreases 0.013*0.1=0.13% 
5 Estimation Results of Linear Probability Model are suppressed for 
brevity. 
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 Model LPM LPM LPM 
DV Daily_bid_dummy 
ln(description) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(duration) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
project budget 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sealed_bid -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
project_nonpublic -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
avg_rating_buyer -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) experience_buyer -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
buyer_gold_membership -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
buyer_ppp -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(description)*seller_winrate  -0.005***  
  (0.001)  
ln(duration)*seller_winrate  -0.004***  
  (0.001)  
ln(description)* 
seller_success_rate   -0.001*** 
   (0.000) 
ln(duration)*seller_success_rate   -0.001*** 
   (0.000) 
month dummies yes yes yes 
bidder-day pair fixed-effects yes yes yes 
N 1,353,088 1,353,088 804,280 
 
(cont’d Table 7) 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Model Logit Logit Logit 
DV Daily_bid_dummy 
ln(description) 0.121*** 0.165*** 0.195*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) 
ln(duration) 0.041*** 0.073*** 0.118*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.022) 
project budget 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.116*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) 
sealed_bid -0.091** -0.092** -0.080* 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.048) 
project_nonpublic -0.268*** -0.269*** -0.219*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.052) 
avg_rating_buyer -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
experience_buyer -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
buyer_gold_membership -0.018 -0.017 -0.013 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) 
buyer_ppp -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ln(description)*seller_winrate  -0.862***  
  (0.106)  
ln(duration)*seller_winrate  -0.663***  
  (0.134)  
ln(description)* 
seller_success_rate   -0.214*** 
   (0.036) 
ln(duration)*seller_success_rate   -0.171*** 
   (0.041) 
month dummies yes yes yes 
bidder-day pair fixed-effects yes yes yes 
N 617,273 617,273 390,092 
Note: a. Robust standard errors clustered by bidder-day pair are 
reported in parentheses; b. p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
7. General Discussion 
 
7.1. Discussion 
 
This paper aims to investigate how auction design 
parameters, namely auction duration and auction 
description, affect auction outcomes and project 
outcomes. Our research provides empirical evidence 
regarding the strategic roles of auction duration and 
auction description as a potential screening mechanism 
for online labor matching platforms. Shorter duration 
and shorter description help screen out less experienced 
and capable bidders, and in turn lead to higher 
contractor quality and greater likelihood of project 
success. This research contributes to the literature by 
showing how auction design can potentially serve as a 
screening mechanism, and how they affect bidder 
quality and auction outcomes. Our finding also helps 
explain why many online labor matching platforms have 
now placed a limit on auction duration.    
 
7.2 Implications 
 
The implications from our findings are offered as 
follows. On the practical side, buyers of IT software 
services interested in using the online labor matching 
platform have to understand that their intuition may 
work against expectations, as longer auction duration 
and more detailed auction description, while receiving 
more bids, may actually end up attracting more low 
quality contractors and also lead to more contract 
indecision and project incompletion. Apparently, each 
auction for software projects is different and hence 
requires unique auction design specifics, but in general, 
buyers are advised to keep the duration and description 
short to the extent possible. On the research side, auction 
design is found to be more complex than one may think. 
Our paper presents the evidence based on both the 
project-level analysis and the bidder decision level 
analysis and suggests that auction design parameters 
like duration and description, as straightforward as they 
look, deserve more in-depth analysis that may lead to 
other interesting and perhaps even counter-intuitive 
findings.   
 
7.3 Limitations 
 
As with all observational research, our study is not 
free of limitations. One limitation of this study is that 
the auction design parameters examined here are 
choices of the buyers, so these auction design 
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 parameters potentially suffer from a selection effect. In 
this paper, we have controlled for project characteristics 
such as project category and project budget, and hence 
the selection effect related to unobserved buyer choice 
of design parameter is not serious. However, future 
research could seek to randomize such design features 
with field experimentations in these markets. Besides, 
to ensure similarity across projects, double postings may 
be needed and hence impose additional challenges.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
In this study, we assess the effects of two auction 
design parameters, namely duration and description, on 
auction outcomes (i.e., number of bids and bidder 
quality) and project outcomes (i.e., project being 
contracted and being completed). Our empirical results 
reveal that auctions with longer duration and longer 
description receive more bids, but they also attract more 
low-quality contractors with lower win rate and lower 
completion rate. Our findings suggest that auction 
duration and auction description can be employed as a 
potential screening mechanism for bidder quality on the 
online labor matching platforms. Overall, our study 
makes a contribution to the related literature by 
providing new insights into the effective design of 
auctions on these platforms. Implications are also drawn 
from our findings for both practice and research. 
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